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In this chapter, we provide an overview of the conducted research, including a 
background of the problem and the purpose of the study. Additionally, we examine our 
research questions and describe the research benefits and limitations. Finally, we discuss 
the organization of this paper, followed by a summary of the chapter. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has long struggled with cost overruns in 
major acquisition programs (Gideon & Wasek, 2015). Researchers have attempted to 
identify the cause of these overruns, but the numerous independent variables involved 
make this a difficult task. Additionally, the DoD remains on the Government 
Accountability Office’s (GAO) High-Risk List for contract management, and the DoD 
Inspector General (DoD IG) declared that DoD contract management is a top 10 
management challenge. The DoD has made some contract management improvements 
in services acquisitions since 2017, via strong leadership support, but continues to face 
challenges with requirements definitions, acquisition strategies, and budgets (GAO, 
2019). The GAO (2019) provided several recommendations that may improve this high-
risk area, including that the DoD needs to “establish milestones … to include projected 
spending on services in its future-years defense programs” (p. 11). Adhering to this 
customary recommendation becomes complex when program requirements evolve ex 
post (post-award), stifling the overarching goal of resource stability and mission 
effectiveness.  
To manage federal contracting more effectively, in 1992, the GAO added DoD 
Contract Management to the High-Risk List, where it has remained ever since. The DoD 
experiences difficulties in defining, strategically managing, and budgeting for contracted 
services, which consistently account for approximately $150 billion—half of the 
Department’s annual obligations (GAO, 2019). The GAO (2019) identified several 
critical skills gaps, including DoD contract management staffing challenges, that is, the 
inability to recruit talent for acquisition management. The DoD contract and acquisition 
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leaders must address challenges within the acquisition workforce, services acquisitions, 
and operational contract support to circumvent the GAO’s high-risk list. The DoD has 
made progress in some of these areas but still needs improvement overall. It is also 
essential to consider the DoD’s increased weapons systems acquisition investments, 
which cost an estimated $1.66 trillion to develop and procure 86 major defense 
acquisition programs (GAO, 2019). Coupling the increasingly complex, highly technical 
systems requirements with the reduced size of the skilled acquisition workforce makes 
for a potential challenge for effective contract negotiation and management, “falling 
short of cost, schedule, and performance goals” (GAO, 2019, p. 143). Subsequently, the 
DoD will pay more, buy less, and deliver fewer warfighter capabilities than expected. 
Furthermore, acquisition and contract management are within the top 10 
management challenges in the DoD Inspector General’s (IG) report in 2020, due in part 
to cost overruns. According to the DoD IG (2019), “Acquisition and contract 
management have been high-risk areas for the DoD for many years, and the DoD and 
Congress have sought to improve the acquisitions of major weapon systems” (p. 112). 
As the DoD seeks to implement acquisition reform, many programs will fail to meet 
schedule, cost, and performance goals. The DoD has found enduring issues with DoD 
contract pricing due to the lack of available cost data, which results in contracting 
officers awarding bad deals that provide exorbitant profits to the contractor. 
“Contracting officers need to obtain the information to ensure that the DoD gets the best 
price for the warfighter” (DoD IG, 2019, p. 118). The DoD IG (2019) report also echoes 
the major systems acquisition challenges associated with requirement complexity. The 
DoD lacks consistency in precise requirements definition, which regularly results in cost 
overruns. An acquisition program’s overarching goal is to deliver a capability that meets 
the warfighter’s need, on time, at or below the budgeted price. The DoD has frequently 
exceeded program budgets and established timelines due to inadequate requirements 
development and contractor oversight. 
The DoD has long relied on contractor support to provide many goods and 
services, including weapons systems, modernization and maintenance, and operational 
support. Historically, the DoD obligates more contract dollars than all the other 
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government agencies combined. As reported by the Moshe Schwartz and the 
Congressional Research Service (2018), in fiscal year (FY) 2017, the DoD spent $380 
billion on contracts, roughly 63% of the total government spending of $507 billion. The 
same report noted that services contracts accounted for 41% of the complete contract 
spend for the DoD in FY17. Concurrently, declining budgets and increased national 
security concerns posed by China, Iran, North Korea, and other states confront U.S. 
leadership with challenging decisions concerning force posture and supply security 
within the U.S. defense industrial base (DIB). Without the DIB support, the United 
States would struggle to maintain a competitive advantage militarily (Watts, 2013). 
There is a reliance on defense contractors and a mandate to “deliver, on a timely basis, 
the best value product or service to the customer, while maintaining the public’s trust 
and fulfilling public policy objectives” (FAR 1.102(a)). These issues force contracting 
organizations to do due diligence, ensuring that each acquisition provides goods and 
services at a fair and reasonable price. 
The root causes of significant acquisition program correlated risks, according to 
Gideon and Wasek (2015), are within one of four categories: programmatic/business, 
technical, schedule, and cost. Instead of focusing on the causes of the cost overruns, this 
research examines the relationship between the Independent Government Cost Estimate 
(IGCE) and the actual cost of products and services procured by the U.S. government, 
specifically the DoD. This research focuses on the relationship between IGCEs and 
actual contract costs and how that relationship is affected by other procurement 
variables. With the fiscal constraints that the DoD is consistently subject to and the 
substantial amount of resources allocated to this organization, the DoD is responsible for 
ensuring that the government is getting maximum value from its services contracts. The 
DoD views a service contract’s value from three lenses: cost, schedule, and performance 
(Cooley & Ruhm, 2014). The DoD’s measurement tool for a service contract’s cost is 
the IGCE, which generates an overall assessment of the product or service’s cost a 
contractor provides to the government. As Ipsaro (2011) noted, “A credible IGCE will 
result in the avoidance of, or mitigation against, major risks and adverse consequences 
improving the probability of acquisition and program management success” (p. 50).  
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem addressed in this research is the disparity between estimated 
contract cost, contract award amount, and actual contract cost upon completion. Naval 
Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR) acquisition professionals have 
come to expect the IGCE to be significantly higher than the proposal and subsequent 
contract award. Additionally, they have observed that the actual contract costs are much 
closer to the IGCE than the award amount. This delta between estimated and actual costs 
causes budgeting issues and inefficiencies between the distinct programs for which 
NAVWAR is responsible. Overall, a study of the relationship between these different 
costs and how they affect each other provides insight into the need for accurate IGCEs 
in government contracting and the best practices for generating them. 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of our research is to understand the relationship between the IGCE 
and actual contract costs and how other procurement variables, such as contract award 
amount, number of modifications, and contractor business size affect this relationship. 
Understanding these relationships will potentially help contracting organizations gain 
the best value for the taxpayer dollar by structuring contracts that result in increased 
capability while obtaining the estimated cost, schedule, and performance thresholds.  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following questions are the basis for our research: 
1. What is the relationship between IGCEs and actual contract costs? 
2. How do the following procurement variables affect that relationship? 
• Contract award amount 
• Number of modifications 
• Business size 
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E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research provides DoD and U.S. Navy acquisition professionals with insight 
and awareness of the importance and validity of IGCEs and how they relate to actual 
contract costs and contractor performance. Additionally, this research provides 
awareness of the effects of other procurement variables (source selection method, award 
fees, contract award amount, business size) on the relationship between IGCEs 
(procurement variable) and actual costs and contractor performance (performance 
variables). Overall, this research provides perspective leading to streamlined 
acquisitions and contracts that provide goods and services at the best value to the 
government and, in turn, to the taxpayer. 
There are multiple limitations to this research that could hinder its application to 
the DoD as an enterprise-wide solution. First, the data comes from one source, 
NAVWAR, during a 5-year window (2014−2019), limiting the research scope to one 
contracting organization in a specific military branch and excluding many relevant 
contracts outside of our time frame. Secondly, the contract data utilized for analysis is 
derived only from knowledge-based services contracts, narrowing the scope of research 
to a specific set of government requirements, and not providing a holistic analysis of 
other contract data. Lastly, similar studies will need to be conducted in other 
government organizations and their contracting offices to gain a more comprehensive 
analysis of the problem.  
F. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
This report is organized into six chapters, including this introductory chapter. 
The second chapter of this report contains a literature review of the applicable contract 
management frameworks, reviews contract management standards and applicable policy 
and guidance, and examines previous research on procurement variables and their 
relationships and effects on associated performance variables. The third chapter provides 
background information for Department of the Navy (DoN) and NAVWAR 
acquisitions, including its mission, contract portfolio, and IGCE procedures and 
guidance. The fourth chapter presents the methodology used to obtain and analyze the 
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data. Next, the fifth chapter contains our analysis results, including a discussion of 
whether the results and findings answer the research questions and the implications of 
the findings. Lastly, the final chapter provides a summary of the research conducted for 
this paper, a conclusion of the results, and offers areas of further research. 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the background and purpose of our research, and it 
outlined the questions this report seeks to answer. This chapter also discussed the 
benefits and limitations of our research to provide context to this complex problem and 
















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this literature review is to explicate the relationship between the 
IGCE and the actual contract costs, along with how other procurement variables, such as 
business size, product service code, contract award amount, and the number of 
modifications, affect this relationship. It begins with an overview of the agency and 
auditability theories, then discusses the Contract Management Body of Knowledge 
(CMBOK), the DoD IGCE Handbook for Services Acquisition, and previous research 
conducted in this area of study, concluding with a summary of the discussion. Our 
industry partners tend to know more about the products and services they sell, and the 
costs associated; the government knows less about the costs, therefore yielding 
asymmetrical information. The government establishes a cost estimate to reduce 
information asymmetry. Acquisition professionals can use Agency Theory to mitigate 
information asymmetry, specifically adverse selection, as discussed in the next section. 
B. AGENCY THEORY 
In principal–agent relationships, especially when involved in complex contracts 
with higher uncertainty levels, the government, and the contractor’s available 
information is commonly asymmetrical (Rendon, 2015). The government will most 
likely have more information regarding the agency’s specific needs. In comparison, the 
contractor may have more information on market trends and costs of products and 
services. The combination of existing conflicting objectives and information asymmetry 
causes increased complexity in contract negotiations (Rendon, 2015). Agency theory 
suggests that agencies can overcome information asymmetry by adopting the appropriate 
means to select contractors (to prevent adverse selection) and monitor contractor 
performance (to prevent moral hazard). “Adverse selection refers to the 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 61). For example, the 
agent may include in the proposal that they have the expertise necessary to meet the 
requirement needs when, in fact, they lack the essential skills.  
 
8 
Additionally, a moral hazard is when the principal cannot determine whether the 
agent behaves appropriately during contract performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
government can use the government estimate to resolve these problems.  
According to agency theory, conflicting objectives and asymmetrical information 
drive perfunctory behavior, causing cost risks in a contract. Thus, government agencies 
must provide incentives to promote consummate behavior and guidelines to prevent 
perfunctory behavior, pay attention to detail, and display vigor in establishing the IGCE 
to overcome these concerns. Second, agency theory explains the relationship between a 
principal and an agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the context of this research, the principal 
(government) enters into a relationship (contract) with an agent (contractor) to perform a 
task on the principal’s behalf. This relationship is complicated as both parties have 
conflicting objectives. Monczka et al. (2016) proposed that the government’s objectives 
“include obtaining the product or service at the right quality, right quantity, right source, 
right time, and right price … procured in accordance with public policy and statutory 
requirements” (Rendon, 2015, p. 1483). This research is most concerned with the right 
price, attempting to discover how the IGCE affects the actual contract cost. Contractors, 
conducting business as the agents, are more interested in increasing profits, gaining 
market share, promoting company growth, and improving cash flow (Rendon, 2015). 
These objectives should be managed appropriately and sustained to ensure a long-term 
contract relationship that results in a win-win. Ex post and ex ante contract success 
depend on quality market research and accurate IGCEs. It is essential that the 
government do its due diligence when conducting market research and ultimately 
establish the IGCE. 
Additionally, government agencies must complete thorough market research and 
cost estimation to minimize the asymmetrical information and lower the associated cost 
risks. In addition to conflicting objectives, asymmetrical information fortifies the 
principal–agent relationship complexity. In higher-risk contracts, there is an elevated 
level of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and conflict of interests (King & Sekerka, 
2017). This higher level of uncertainty encourages risk aversion in both the principal and 
agent and urges both parties to gain competitive advantages that meet self-interests. On 
 
9 
the one hand, the government attempts to satisfy the requirement’s owner, military 
leaders, and the public while attempting to obtain a fair and reasonable price. Therefore, 
it must depend on ex ante activities to grasp an enhanced understanding of the associated 
procurement costs and utilize adept market research to establish an IGCE that will 
positively predict the requirement’s actual contract costs. However, since contractors are 
privy to this information, they may exploit the asymmetric information to achieve and 
maximize organizational and personal objectives depending on the number of 
uncertainties. As a result, the government’s ex ante and ex-post procurement success 
depend on quality market research and an accurate IGCE. 
Agency Theory states that contracting agencies must obtain additional 
information and mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Quality market 
research and accurate IGCEs are sources of information that can combat these problems. 
However, the DoD we must have competent people, capable processes, and effective 
internal controls to succeed in this endeavor. These elements come from Auditability 
Theory, as discussed in the next section. 
C. AUDITABILITY THEORY 
For organizations to be successful, they must have competent people, capable 
processes, and effective internal controls. The variance found between the IGCE and 
actual contract cost could be due to a lack of competent people, incapable processes, and 
lack of internal controls. Today, public and private organizations are increasingly 
concerned with governance and analysis within their business processes and practices 
(Rendon & Rendon, 2016). Because of this, organizations are underscoring the ability to 
audit such components, establishing some form of accountability. Consequently, as 
referenced by Rendon and Rendon (2016), Powers stated that organizations are 
transforming by introducing data collection methodology and documentation systems to 
establish auditability of the processes and practices. Additionally, Rendon and Rendon 
(2016) stated that auditability encompasses segments of governance that include 
competent people, capable processes, and effective internal controls, which, combined, 




Figure 1. Auditability Triangle. Source: 
Adapted from Rendon and Rendon (2016). 
1. Competent People 
One of the components of Auditability Theory is competent people. This refers 
to people within an organization who are educated, trained, and experienced. 
Organizations determine what type of education, training, and experience level 
personnel need to be successful. Within the DoD, specifically in contract management, 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) requirements are used to 
determine personnel education, training, and experience levels required for 
organizational and personnel success.  
Rendon and Rendon (2016) defined competent personnel as follows:  
The competent personnel component refers to the education, training and 
experience of the DoD contracting officers performing contract 
management activities. The required education, training and experience 
standards of DoD contracting officers are mandated by the DAWIA 
federal statute, which was established in 1990. DAWIA requires 
members of the DoD contracting workforce to have earned a college 
degree with courses in business administration, completed training 
courses in contract management and have experience within the 
contracting profession. (p. 754) 
Competent personnel are essential in this study, as the relationship between the 
evaluated variables may be due to personnel incompetence and the inability to execute 
an IGCE properly. An acquisition professional’s competence is foundational to an 
accurate cost estimate. The career’s fluidity requires contracting professionals to be 
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abreast of the constantly changing policies, procedures, and guidance that affect 
everyday business. As the executive vice president and counsel of the Professional 
Services Council stated, “Successful acquisition programs depend on a highly trained, 
highly skilled workforce in the government and the support contractors, especially for 
complex technology and professional services contracts” (Bublé, 2019, p. 2). To address 
some of the managerial and technical skill gaps in government procurement, the DoD 
must reevaluate and restructure education and training programs. Although government 
procurement professionals must be educated, trained, and experienced, the individual’s 
competence cannot be the sole focus. There must also be an emphasis on the 
organization’s competence through capable processes (Rendon & Rendon, 2016). 
2. Capable Processes 
Another Auditability Theory component is capable processes. For an 
organization to be successful, processes must be institutionalized, measured, and 
improved. Organizations determine what processes need to be performed to ensure 
organizational success. Within the DoD, specifically in contract management, processes 
are institutionalized, measured, and improved within the three contract phases: pre-
award, award, and post-award as defined in the CMBOK discussed later. 
Rendon and Rendon (2016) defined capable processes as follows:  
The capable process component of auditability reflects DoD contract 
management processes and related activities performed by the contracting 
workforce. Contracting processes are typically discussed in terms of the 
contracting life cycle, which include pre-award, award and post-award 
processes. (p. 754) 
Without clear IGCE guidance and methodologies, acquisition agencies may be 
missing out on the full benefit of this vital acquisition tool (GAO, 2017). Organizational 
processes must be institutionalized as they set the intellectual and innovative boundaries 
of an organization. Without capable processes and a mechanism to measure progress, an 
organization cannot achieve its maximum potential of cost estimation and procurement 
success. Regulation and bureaucracy heavily burden government procurement by 
making contracting professionals’ jobs more challenging and cumbersome. Top officials 
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support the DoD’s acquisition endeavor to cut some of this red tape by delegating 
contracting authority to contracting agencies and combatant commanders (Williams, 
2020). Therefore, it is imperative to continuously improve these processes, molding 
them to meet the mission’s flexibility. Contracting organizations must have processes to 
optimize and effectively exercise this authority in processes throughout the contracting 
life cycle (pre-award, award, and post-award). Furthermore, these established processes 
must be institutionalized, measurable, and continuously improved to meet the 
requirements owners’ ever-changing demands and ultimately, to meet the needs of the 
warfighter (Rendon & Rendon, 2016). In addition to competent people and capable 
processes, organizations must also have effective internal controls. 
3. Effective Internal Controls 
The last component of Auditability Theory is effective internal controls. 
Effective internal controls are enforced, monitored, and reported. Organizations know 
which internal controls are needed to ensure that personnel, and the organization as a 
whole, are in compliance with policy, procedure, laws, and regulations. Effective 
internal controls are especially important within the DoD, specifically in contract 
management, as non-compliance with the multitude of contract policies can lead to 
mission failure. 
Rendon and Rendon (2016) defined effective internal controls as follows:  
The effective internal controls component of auditability refers to the 
objectives of enforcing internal control policies to ensure compliance 
with laws and regulations, monitoring procedures to assess enforcement 
and reporting any material weaknesses. (p. 754) 
DoD IG (2015) found material weaknesses in internal controls over financial 
reporting that could lead to the lack of management oversight and material misstatement 
prevention in financial statements. The same report stated that without effective internal 
controls, the management systems that the DoD relies upon could be compromised 
(DoD IG, 2015). According to federal internal control standards, the GAO (2017) stated, 
acquisition agencies should provide clear guidance in acquisition planning by providing 
quality information to achieve acquisition objectives. In the same report, the GAO 
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recommended that agencies revise or clarify guidance to improve the usefulness of 
IGCEs. An IGCE can furnish effective communication of these objectives; however, if 
there are no internal controls in place, continuity and consistency of IGCE guidance and 
procedures can be lost across the enterprise. Internal controls are vital in the DoD’s 
effort to provide an “interoperable and data-centric procurement environment” (Assad & 
Easton, 2011, p. 1).  
The internal controls support government procurement strategic goals by 
providing accountability, transparency, and integrity to the procurement process. They 
can also provide a foundation for managing contractor costs by establishing a 
comprehensive IGCE. Internal controls can be ineffective if procurement personnel are 
going through the procurement process with an inaccurate IGCE. Although cost 
estimates are an essential piece of the contract award process and used for negotiations, 
there has not been much research to support their use. Next, we will be discussing some 
of the research conducted on IGCE and actual costs. 
D. PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
The following section provides examples of studies conducted on the 
relationships between different variables in the procurement process. Some of these 
variables included contract type, source selection method, and CPARS ratings. An 
overview of the previous research provides context to the problem and identifies the 
subject’s gaps, allowing this research to illustrate how to fill the gap. Overall, there have 
been multiple studies and research methods that identify relationships between 
procurement and performance variables, but the following are especially pertinent to our 
research focusing on IGCEs. 
Multiple studies have analyzed the relationship between procurement variables 
(IGCEs, contract award amount), and performance variables (CPARS ratings, actual 
contract cost). One example of such a study conducted by Landale et al. (2017) 
examined the source selection method’s effects on procurement outcomes. Structured 
similarly to our research, the researchers gathered contract data from 124 DoD contracts. 
They ran a regression analysis to test the source selection method (procurement variable) 
 
14 
on pertinent procurement outcomes (performance variables). Furthermore, the authors’ 
research began discussing ex ante (pre-award) and ex post (post-award) evaluation of 
value based on multiple components, including price. The study found that the trade-off 
(TO) source selection method, number of evaluation factors, and number of proposals 
received all increase the procurement lead time (PLT). Additionally, the research found 
TO source selections results in better supplier performance. Overall, the study conducted 
by Landale et al. (2015) provided a roadmap for our research structure, but the variables 
examined differ from ours. 
Another example of research conducted to understand the relationship between 
procurement and performance variables was Ban et al. (2017). Their study examined and 
analyzed the relationship between source selection method and contractor performance. 
In addition to contractor performance, they looked at the source selection method and its 
relationship to procurement acquisition lead time (PALT). Much like the study 
conducted by Landale et al. (2015), these authors used a multiple regression model and 
multivariate and univariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA and ANCOVA) 
techniques to determine contractor performance variance. The procurement variable 
examined was based on Lowest Price Technically Acceptable (LPTA) and trade-off 
source selection strategies and their corresponding CPARS ratings. The findings, in this 
study, also showed that TO source selection procedures may result in more positive 
contract performance outcomes. Overall, this research provided a proof of concept and 
the effectiveness of statistical analysis in identifying relationships between procurement 
and performance variables and how each variable affects another.  
Borbath et al. (2018) evaluated contractor performance using an empirical 
approach. The authors used quantitative measures of contractor performance to improve 
supplier selection decisions (Borbath et al., 2018). Additionally, the authors conducted 
data analysis using summary statistics, including mean and standard deviation, to answer 
their research questions on the technical performance, schedule, and cost regarding 
contract performance. Furthermore, the authors used summary statistics to conclude the 
level of correlation between the procurement variables (an obligated dollar amount) and 
the subsequent performance variable (CPARS ratings). This methodology used by 
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Borbath et al. (2018) is a guide for the research conducted in this paper. This research 
focuses on the cost aspect of the contract, as opposed to the performance. It uses a 
similar model to understand the relationship between IGCEs, actual contract cost, and 
the number of modifications conducted throughout the performance period. The findings 
indicate a strong correlation between contractor past and subsequent cost, schedule, and 
technical performance scores. Overall, using the same methodology will aid in the 
government’s understanding of IGCEs, the importance of their accuracy, and the 
relationship they have to actual contract cost. This information could drive contracting, 
budgeting, and cost estimation decisions in the future.  
In 2020, the GAO conducted a study on different contract types and how they 
affect contractor performance and schedule. They “analyzed government contracting 
data on obligations by contract type for FY 2011 through FY 2019 on contracts in 
DoD’s portfolio of major acquisition programs” (GAO, 2020, p. 2). The GAO did not 
find a clear relationship between these outcomes and contract types used. However, 
programs that completed certain knowledge-based acquisition practices generally had 
better cost and schedule outcomes than programs that did not implement those practices 
(GAO, 2020). Furthermore, this report’s significance to our research reveals that 
researchers have studied contract type, a procurement variable, and its relationship to 
cost and schedule in the past. Our research seeks to understand how cost performance 
and IGCEs relate to actual versus estimated contract costs and to gain a clearer 
understanding of the disparity between the two. Overall, DoD acquisition professionals 
across the enterprise recognize a delta between actual and estimated contract costs but 
have not identified the relational effects they have on each other.  
The previous research discussed adds relevant conversation to the CMBOK in 
terms of relationships between the procurement variables and performance variables. 
The next section provides an overview of the CMBOK as prescribed by the National 
Contract Management Association (NCMA). 
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E. THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
It is critical to understand the core concepts of contract management to grasp the 
role of IGCEs in the government procurement process. The most comprehensive and 
accurate source to understanding contract management’s core concepts is the Contract 
Management Body of Knowledge (CMBOK), developed by the NCMA. The CMBOK 
“explains the seven core competencies that serve as essential building blocks for 
successful contracting practitioners and leaders” (National Contract Management 
Association [NCMA], 2020, p. 1). 
As outlined in Figure 2, the CMBOK provides seven core competencies critical 
to individual and organizational success with a central mission of contracting and 
acquisition. Understanding these roles and responsibilities is imperative when 
conducting a study on IGCEs, their relationships to contractor performance and overall 
actual contract cost, and how other procurement variables change those relationships. 
Furthermore, the CMBOK provides a methodology and mindset for the measurement of 
success. This is achieved through activities that require direct interaction and in 
situations where there is no direct contact (i.e., planning) (Contract Management 
Standard [CMS], 2019, p. 2). The direct and indirect interactions in the contracting 
process entwine with the IGCE development process. 
 
Figure 2. CMBOK’s Seven Core Competencies. Source: NCMA (2019a).  
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Of the seven core competencies, three are particularly crucial to IGCEs and 
actual contract cost: (1) pre-award, (2) award, and (3) post-award. These are considered 
life-cycle phases in the contract management process. The following are explanations 
and descriptions of these three different phases and their relation to this report’s 
research. 
The pre-award competencies cover different areas that are critical to the contract 
management process. Although they occur at the beginning of the contract management 
process, these competencies are relevant throughout the contract’s life cycle and 
influence decision-making. Before the contract management process begins, each of the 
pre-award competencies must be fundamentally understood (CMBOK, 2019, p. 2). The 
following excerpt from NCMA’s Contract Management Standard (CMS) publication 
describes the pre-award phase: 
Pre-Award is the first phase of the contract life cycle. The pre-award 
process for the buyer includes assisting the customer in defining the 
requirement. Additionally, the process includes developing a 
comprehensive plan for fulfilling the requirement in a timely manner at a 
reasonable price. This is accomplished by developing and executing an 
overall strategy for the purchase, which is accomplished through 
researching the marketplace, developing contracting strategies, preparing 
solicitations, and requesting offers. The pre-award process for the seller 
includes developing and executing a strategy for obtaining the award for 
a contract, including pre-sales activities, market strategies, and 
responding to the solicitation. (2019b, p. 10) 
The IGCE is an integral part of the pre-award phase, playing a role in acquisition 
planning, evaluation of offerors, and determination of price fairness and reasonableness. 
The pre-award phase of the contracting life cycle begins with acquisition planning. This 
portion of the acquisition process includes forming the right team to build a 
requirements package. Subject matter experts (SMEs) of the particular field comprise 
the requirement’s multifunctional team (MFT). This team includes members of the 
requiring activity, the contracting officer, the comptroller, and legal representatives, to 
name a few. One crucial piece of the requirements package is the IGCE. In conjunction 
with the requirement’s owner, the contracting officer ensures the requirement is clearly 
defined in order to estimate the cost of the product or service correctly. 
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Additionally, the importance of the IGCE cannot be understated because it is 
used by the contracting officer to determine whether a price in a proposal is fair and 
reasonable. Furthermore, an IGCE has a pivotal role in the budgeting process by 
ensuring the requiring activity has the funding to execute a particular contract. Overall, 
the MFT generates the IGCE during the pre-award phase of the contracting process, and 
its accuracy is instrumental in the contract’s success throughout its life span. Figure 3 is 
a visual representation and explanation of the use of an IGCE throughout the contracting 
life cycle. 
 
Figure 3. Use of IGCEs in All Phases of the CM Process. 
Source: Schwartz et al. (2018). 
Once all documentation has been gathered and reviewed, the contracting officer 
posts a solicitation on the government-wide point of entry, or BetaSAM 
(Beta.SAM.gov), which allows the government to post a solicitation for goods or 
services in a public manner to encourage competition and allows each interested party to 
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have a chance to do business with the government. The contracting officer is now ready 
to evaluate proposals in preparation for source selection and the award phase.  
The IGCE is the document used as a baseline for comparing an offer with the 
amount that the requirement’s owner, in unison with the contracting officer, thinks the 
government should pay. If there is a large delta between the IGCE and industry offers, 
the contracting officer and the requirement’s owner have to reassess what they are 
asking for and ensure they have a proper understanding of the costs associated with 
delivering that requirement. The second phase of the contract life cycle is the award 
phase. The CMS states, “The award process involves all the work performed by both the 
buyer and seller that produces an awarded contract. Some contracts are straightforward, 
and others are exceedingly complex, but the majority fall somewhere in between” 
(NCMA, 2019b, p. 13). 
Once the offers are received, the award process begins. Responsibilities for the 
buyer (government) include price or cost analysis, evaluating offers, conducting 
negotiations (as applicable), selecting the source, awarding the contract(s), debriefing 
offerors, and addressing mistakes in offers and seller challenges to the selection process 
(NCMAb, 2019). Responsibilities for the seller (contractor) include clarifying offers, 
participating in negotiations, and preparing final offers (NCMAb, 2019, p. 13). One 
required criterion for making a contract award is the contracting officer’s determination 
that the offer’s price is fair and reasonable. Overall, the IGCE plays a pivotal role in the 
award process, and its accuracy is essential for success.  
When the contract is awarded, the acquisition moves directly into the post-award 
phase of the contract management process. According to the CMS publication (NCMA, 
2019b), the post-award phase involves the following. Post-award contract management 
functions are known as “contract administration” and “contract closeout.” The contract 
administration functions will vary greatly depending on the complexity of the contract. 
Both the buyer and seller are actively involved in contract administration to ensure 
satisfactory performance and bring the contract to a successful conclusion (NCMA, 
2019b, p. 16). 
 
20 
Analyzing the IGCE in the post-award phase can reveal multiple observations 
about the effectiveness of the contract structure established in the pre-award and award 
phases. While administering the contract in the post-award phase, contracting 
professionals can look back at the IGCE to determine how accurate the government’s 
expected costs were to the actual finalized contract amount after the performance. 
Furthermore, the IGCE can be used in the post-award phase to develop lessons learned 
to estimate the cost of future contracts more accurately. There are many roles and 
responsibilities that both the buyer and seller must fulfill to ensure the success of the 
acquisition and ultimately, the integrity of the contracting process. The buyer must 
conduct some of the tasks effectively by addressing any issues arising during contract 
performance that might increase performance risk, executing contract modifications, 
monitoring compliance of contract terms, making payment(s), and closing out the 
contract (NCMAb, 2019, p. 16). Additionally, the seller has a responsibility to conduct 
similar tasks: overseeing contract performance, invoicing, engaging in subcontracting 
activities, managing contract changes, and bringing the contract to a successful 
conclusion (NCMAb, 2019, p. 16). Overall, the IGCE is a relevant and vital document 
throughout the three contract management process phases. Because the IGCE is a 
critical tool for all contract management phases, it is imperative that acquisition 
workforce leaders provide clear guidance describing how to effectively establish the 
IGCE. This research, as explained in later sections, will be focusing on services 
acquisitions. The following section discusses the DoD IGCE Handbook for Services 
Acquisition.  
F. DOD IGCE HANDBOOK FOR SERVICES ACQUISITION 
The DoD IGCE Handbook for Services Acquisition provides fundamental 
guidance for the DoD’s acquisition workforce (AWF), focusing on the cost elements 
commonly found in the IGCEs of services contract acquisitions. This guide helps 
explain the purpose and importance of the IGCE. The information and examples 
provided are at the most basic level, which allows the AWF’s least experienced 
professionals and non-DoD acquisition professionals to understand the IGCE better. 
Additionally, this handbook provides an appendix of thought-provoking examples that 
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present a starting point for creating the cost estimate (DoD, 2018, p. 2). Because this 
handbook is thought of as the government’s most transparent and confident source of the 
contract’s potential costs, the DoD AWF must understand how this instrumental tool can 
be appropriately used during the planning and award phases of services contracts (DoD, 
2018). This section provides a discussion of the purpose of IGCE, principles, cost 
estimation methods, and general best practices, as discussed in the DoD IGCE 
Handbook for Services Acquisition. 
The DoD (2018) stated that the IGCE is a cost estimate created by the 
requirement’s owner, based on the performance work statement (PWS) or statement of 
work (SOW), for all new requirements with anticipated costs above the simplified 
acquisition threshold (SAT). The IGCE is an essential tool that can assist the DoD AWF 
in determining the probable cost of a services acquisition and also the reasonableness of 
an offeror’s proposal and understanding of the work to be completed. As shown in 
Figure 4, IGCE development occurs during the 7-Step Services Acquisition Process 
requirements definition phase. During this phase, it is imperative that the requirement’s 
MFT has a clear understanding of the requirement and access to prior acquisition history 
or similar acquisitions, and that the MFT conducts thorough market research that can 
provide the foundation of IGCE preparation. 
 
Figure 4. Seven-Step Services Acquisition Process and IGCE. 
Source: DoD (2018). 
 
22 
The IGCE is used to project and anticipate the probable cost or price of federal 
acquisitions during all phases of a program, including the life-cycle cost and total 
operating cost. With no contractor input, agencies use the IGCE to achieve the best 
value and address contract risk. It is based on market research and can be used to 
analyze cost and pricing data. The established IGCE is also used to reserve funds during 
the acquisition planning phase—this can become an issue as an inaccurate IGCE can 
mean a decreased budget for other programs. When contractors submit proposals to 
perform these services, there are instances when the proposed prices vary significantly 
from the IGCE. This variance presents a problem because the contract’s negotiated cost 
may be higher than the IGCE. The program office has to reallocate resources when the 
awarded contract costs are above the budget reflected by the IGCE.  
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the agency and auditability theories, previous research 
regarding IGCE and actual contract costs, the CMBOK, and the DoD IGCE Handbook 
for Services Acquisitions. Now that the foundation of our research is set, the next chapter 









III. NAVAL INFORMATION WARFARE SYSTEMS COMMAND 
(NAVWAR) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter lays the foundation for our analysis by providing background 
information for DoN and NAVWAR acquisitions, including NAVWAR’s mission, 
contract portfolio, and IGCE procedures and guidance. This section provides context to 
this organization’s importance and how effective and efficient contract cost estimation 
processes and procedures are imperative to mission success.  
B. NAVWAR STRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS 
NAVWAR is aligned by competency as shown in Figure 5. The eight major 
competencies are “patterns of skills, knowledge, abilities, behaviors and other 
characteristics that an individual needs to perform work roles or occupational functions 
successfully” (NAVWAR, 2020, para. 1). Of these competencies, our study is focused 
on 2.0 Contracts. The 2.0 Contracts competency provides NAVWAR with contracting 
officers and support staff, who are responsible for conducting contracting functions for 
PEOs.  
 




NAVWAR changed its name in June 2019 (from Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command, or SPAWAR) to acknowledge the power of information warfare 
and its impact on global competition (Rosenberg, 2019). NAVWAR (2020) stated, 
“Over the last decade, information has emerged as a warfighting domain, joining land, 
sea, and air as a critical, contested battlespace” (para. 3). NAVWAR serves as the 
Navy’s information and technology arm, charged with developing, delivering, and 
sustaining communications and information warfare capabilities, connecting warfighters 
to the fight anytime, anywhere. This large, complex organization expands worldwide, 
employing more than 10,000 active duty and civil service professionals. NAVWAR 
provides “research and development, systems engineering, testing and evaluation, 
technical, in-service and support services to the program executive offices (PEOs) 
during all phases of a program’s life cycle” (NAVWAR, 2020, para. 7). Their specialty 
is computer cybersecurity and many other electronic systems (Graves, 2019).  
NAVWAR provides direct support to three Navy PEOs: PEO Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (PEO C4I), PEO Enterprise 
Information Systems (PEO EIS), and PEO Space Systems (NAVWAR, 2020). These 
PEOs seek to close the naval capability gap by increasing the Navy’s “capacity, security, 
and reliability,” and also by “being affordable and on schedule for delivery to the fleet” 
(NAVWAR, 2020, para. 10). NAVWAR, besides some in-house capabilities, sources a 
large portion of the work through contracts with various defense contractors. With the 
extensive contract portfolio and sustained budget for knowledge-based services, the 
accuracy and integrity of the IGCE become an even more integral part of mission 
success.  
As an organization, NAVWAR spends billions of dollars per year on contracts to 
support the warfighter. One central area of spend that we are focusing on in this research 
is services, specifically knowledge-based services. The services with the highest dollar 
amount obligated at NAVWAR include engineering services (NAICS 541330), with 
roughly $2.5 billion spent in FY 2018 and computer systems design services (NAICS 
541512) with $380 million spent (NAVWAR, 2020). With such a large investment of 
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taxpayer dollars devoted to services contracts, it is imperative to understand any 
inefficiencies associated with services procurement and how they can be diminished, or 
even eliminated. Overall, the magnitude of NAVWAR’s contract portfolio, specifically 
services contracts, further emphasizes the importance of accurate cost estimation 
processes and procedures.  
Our study investigates how small and large businesses can affect the delta 
between the IGCE and the actual contract costs. NAVWAR has served as a nucleus of 
the local economy as businesses flock around this information technology command 
(Graves, 2019). According to Graves (2019), NAVWAR awarded $1.3 billion in 
contracts to San Diego companies in 2018. With a significant portion of this investment 
being in knowledge-based services, it is imperative to understand the relationship 
between estimated costs versus actual costs of these contracts using taxpayer dollars. 
D. SPEND ANALYSIS 
To provide context to NAVWAR’s portfolio, we conducted a spend analysis 
using pivot tables in Excel. The table explains the total spend between 2013 and 2019, 
top vendors (by dollar value) utilized, and other spend data. The following shows the 
total spend by year: 
Table 1. Total Spend by Calendar Year (2013-2019) 














The total contract spend from the data provided was $6,587,257,131.55. While 
understanding the total amount of money obligated by NAVWAR is an effective 
surface-level look at this spend data, identifying the specific vendors and PSC code is 
crucial to established focus areas for resourcing decisions. The following shows the top 
10 PSCs procured in the data set provided. 
Table 2. Total Spend by PSC (2013-2019) 
PSC  Total Spend 
R425  $  3,787,500,470.78 
R408  $   934,748,079.12 
R707  $   908,591,611.87 
R414  $   203,700,387.94 
R706  $   190,526,070.66 
R499  $   181,619,747.73 
R426  $   114,075,201.55 
R710  $    93,475,710.14 
R799  $    62,952,148.12 
R699  $    30,954,868.38 
Grand Total  $  6,508,144,296.29 
 
This data is an important observation because four of the six PSCs analyzed in 
this study are in the top five in the above list. The total spend across these four PSC 
accounted for 88% of the total spend in the 7-year period analyzed. While understanding 
the spend data based on PSCs is important, identifying the top vendors and their top 
PSCs used on their contracts is crucial to provide context to NAVWAR’s portfolio. An 
interesting observation from the spend analysis was when analyzing the top 20% of the 
suppliers, 48% of the obligated funds across the 7 fiscal years resided within those top 
suppliers. Finally, the spend analysis revealed that 31.6% of the obligated funds went to 
small businesses. The below table represents this data point and provides total numbers 




Table 3. Total Spend by Business Size (2013-2019) 
Business Size Total Spend 
OTHER THAN SMALL BUSINESS $4,392,852,556.27 
SMALL BUSINESS $1,388,042,008.45 
(blank) $806,362,566.83 
Grand Total $6,587,257,131.55 
 
Overall, conducting a spend analysis on the data provided for this study by 
NAVWAR enables a general picture and understanding of contract spend across the 
fiscal years. Additionally, this analysis provides context for preliminary observations 
before conducting a more in-depth review of the data. The more in-depth analysis is 
conducted in the subsequent chapters. 
E. IGCE PROCEDURES 
The policy currently in place at NAVWAR is that any contract action over the 
SAT will require an IGCE. During the market research phase of the acquisition, the 
contracting officer will contact vendors with the explicit purpose of cost estimation. The 
Navy Cost Estimating Guide is a resource used at NAVWAR to identify key 
considerations for IGCEs and to understand the elements that comprise an IGCE. 
Additionally, NAVWAR uses a cost estimating team to establish IGCEs for the different 
program offices, including KBS Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) task 
order contracts. Overall, the IGCE process is an important task in the market research 
phase of an acquisition, as well as in the post-award administration of the IDIQ contract.  
The DoN Cost Estimating Guide is used at NAVWAR to produce these 
estimates. The purpose of the DoN Cost Estimating Guide (2010) is to encourage 
concise, dependable, and timely cost estimates within the DoN, delivering the right 
systems to the warfighter at the right time. The guide provides Navy acquisitions, 
contracting, and cost estimation professionals with best practices for systems and 
weapons acquisitions programs. The guide seeks to improve and standardize cost 
estimating processes within the DoN while providing organizations with strategic 
latitude, accounting for various levels of complexity within the defense cost analysis 
field. The guide is a culmination of best practices, identified across the enterprise, for 
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cost analysis practitioners, and other stakeholders, to use within their respective 
organizations (Kunc, 2010). The guide emphasizes the importance of “getting the cost 
right” while balancing cost, capabilities and risks within an environment of scarce 
resources in order to effectively meet the public procurement reform demands (Kunc, 
2010, para. 4).  
The DoN provides six major steps vital for completing a sound independent 
government cost estimate. The first step is to establish needs with stakeholders. Within 
this first step, cost analysts, along with the stakeholders, define the requirement and 
manage cost-analysis activities throughout the life of the requirement. The second step is 
to establish a baseline, where the team develops the program including all of the 
technical specifications and other information needed to complete the cost estimate. The 
third step is to generate the cost estimate baseline. Based on the information produced in 
the second step, the team develops a cost estimate incorporating collected data, models, 
and the associated risks and uncertainties. Afterward, the team conducts risk and 
uncertainty analysis as step four. There is no mention of a preferred technique, as the 
guide encourages organizations to use an acceptable objective technique. The fifth step 
requires the team to verify and validate the cost estimate by critically analyzing the 
inputs, outputs, and methods used in the cost estimating creation phase. Organizations 
can perform the fifth step via peer review and cross-checks. Last, in the sixth step, the 
team presents and defends the estimate; the team is required to document the generated 
cost estimate in preparation for presenting the cost estimate to key decision-makers.  
This research intends to identify the relationship between the IGCE and the 
actual contract cost. Understanding the Navy’s strategic documents regarding IGCE 
development will assist our analysis of the data found. NAVWAR contracting 
organizations have access to guides, policies, and procedures that can be tailored to meet 
the strategic acquisition needs of their respective organizations—the analysis may prove 




Overall, this chapter provided an overview of NAVWAR as an organization. It 
discussed their mission, contract portfolio, and IGCE procedures, adding context to the 
reasoning behind our research and its importance to the DoD, U.S. Navy, and 
NAVWAR. Furthermore, understanding the mission of NAVWAR and how they spend 
their dollars provides a ground-level perspective on their organizational mission focus 
and priorities. Finally, gaining knowledge of the cost-estimating processes and 
procedures in this organization’s acquisition process is critical to understanding the 
















This chapter presents the methodology used for data identification and collection 
methods used to answer this study’s research questions. By describing our approach, we 
hope that it motivates contracting professionals to study this topic across all military 
branches. This chapter further describes the sources of data, types of data retrieved, and 
the process in which the data was collected, specifying the data collection criteria using 
the data collection worksheet.  
B. SOURCE OF DATA 
The research data collection efforts focus on NAVWAR, specifically within the 
2.0 Contracts competency. With the increasing importance of information technology 
emerging as a warfighting domain, combined with the immense contractor support 
NAVWAR maintains, contracting efficiency and value deliverance is vital. Due to the 
increased emphasis on information technology as a new battlespace, balanced with 
reducing budgets, NAVWAR made for a great case of study—exemplifying buying 
power of critical assets under overwhelming cost constraints. 
On February 18, 2020, the secretary of the Navy issued a memorandum enacting 
the Stem-to-Stern (S2S) commission, an effort to garner $40 billion in cost savings over 
FY 2022–2026. The strategy is a “structural change ... to increase naval capabilities” in 
other segments, shipbuilding being one area of focus (Modly, 2020, pg. 2). Increased 
combat capability needs and decreasing budgets impact procurement leaders’ decision-
making and may cut both existing and new procurement programs. Modly (2020) stated 
in the memorandum that there will be “significant reductions in service support 
contracts,” highlighting the importance of controlling costs within NAVWAR 
knowledge-based services contracts. 
NAVWAR Headquarters, San Diego, CA, provided contract data consisting of a 
diverse set of contract actions supporting NAVWAR’s information technology mission. 
As stated, NAVWAR provides direct support to three Navy PEOs: PEO C4I, PEO EIS, 
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and PEO Space Systems (NAVWAR, 2020). PEO C4I provides affordable and 
integrated information warfare capability to the fleet, comprised of a front office and 10 
program offices, focusing on affordability, interoperability, and capability. PEO EIS’s 
mission is to deliver cost-effective enterprise information technology, including 
network, business, and fleet support to the DoN and comprises 10 program offices. Last, 
PEO Space Systems is the executive agent to “develop, deploy, sustain, provide 
engineering support and influence space-based capabilities for naval, joint and allied 
operations” (NAVWAR, 2020, para. 2). The following sections provide an overview of 
the structures and systems NAVWAR Headquarters business analytics team used to 
provide the contract data for this research. 
1. Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 
According to FAR 4.603, all agencies must use the Federal Procurement Data 
System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to report all contract actions exceeding the micro-
purchase threshold, including all modifications to those contracts’ actions. The contract 
action information is input via a Contract Action Report, or CAR, which involves 
various inputs such as contract type, contract award amount, number of offers received, 
and competition level involved in the acquisition. These elements are captured and 
maintained within FPDS-NG, making for efficient access and assessment by contracting 
personnel. NAWAR Business Analytics used FPDS-NG as a tool to identify contract 
actions that met the data collection criteria for this research. 
2. Standard Procurement System Procurement Desktop Defense  
The Standard Procurement System (SPS) is the foundation of the DoD’s 
initiative for paperless acquisition (Consolidated Analysis Center, Inc. (CACI), 2020). 
Procurement Desktop-Defense (PD2) provides contract management professionals with 
streamlined acquisition support, enabling a holistic, end-to-end approach to the 
acquisition process. PD2 offers the contracting professional cradle-to-grave support, 
“from requirements definition/initiation through solicitation, offer evaluation and award 
to contract administration and closeout” (CACI, 2020, p. 2). For this research, PD2 was 




SeaPort-e is the premier electronic contracting platform, providing acquisition 
support for support services in 22 functional areas such as Engineering, Financial 
Management, and Program Management (SeaPort, 2020). NAVWAR, as part of the 
DoN’s Systems Commands, competes services support contracts against the SeaPort-e 
Indefinite-Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) multiple-award contract, consisting of 
over 1,800 contractors. SeaPort-e, much like PD2, was used to obtain data to meet the 
data collection criteria needed to accomplish this research.  
C. DATA COLLECTION 
NAVWAR Business Analytics generated reports, using FPDS-NG, identifying 
knowledge-based services contracts that met the research data criteria. NAVWAR 2.0 
Data Security inspected the data to ensure there were no security risks or vulnerabilities 
and agreed to release the data. The resultant report contained 175,330 contract actions 
from FY 2014–2020 to examine.  
1. Data Collection Criteria 
Although the structures and systems mentioned above provided valuable data 
relevant to the research, additional data was needed to meet the research objectives. The 
data provided by NAVWAR Business Analytics did not include IGCE, the most crucial 
procurement variable in our research, requiring a manual search and recovery of 
information by the PCOs supporting this effort. Understanding that combing through 
175,330 physical contracts could be unduly burdensome, we generated a random sample 
of the provided contract actions to identify contracts meeting the following criteria: 
• Knowledge-based services contracts 
• Product Service Codes (PSCs) 
o R408, Program Management Support 
o R425, Professional Engineering and Technical Services 
o R609, Stenographic Services 
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o R706, Logistics Management Support Services 
o R707, Contract and Procurement Management Support Services 
o R799, Other Management Support Services 
• Fiscal Years 2014 through 2020 
• High dollar contract actions, valued above $2,000,000 
Based on the above criteria, we identified 257 contracts awarded to large 
businesses and 78 contracts awarded to small businesses. The randomized list of 
contracts was provided to NAVWAR 2.0 Contracts procurement contracting officers 
and contract specialists to locate the IGCE. Of the sample provided, NAVWAR 2.0 
Contracts personnel could only locate 21 of the small business contract files and 10 of 
the large business contract files. Only 14 contained the IGCE.  
We reexamined the original data set provided by NAVWAR Analytics to ensure 
the data restrict NAVWAR 2.0 Contracts’ ability to locate the identified contract files. 
We determined that the sample size was large enough for proper access. However, we 
ran another random sample and increased the sample size by decreasing the dollar value 
threshold from $2 million and above to $250,000 and above for small and large business 
contracts. Upon this new sample, 120 contracts (60 small businesses, 60 large 
businesses) were randomly selected. This list was provided to NAVWAR 2.0 Contracts 
to locate the IGCEs. NAVWAR 2.0 Contracts could only locate 21 contract files (14 
large businesses, seven small businesses) that contained the IGCE. The original data set 
and the second data set were combined to make the final data set. Therefore, our final 
data set consisted of 35 contracts containing the IGCE (14 from the original data set and 
21 from the second data set).  
2. Procurement and Performance Variables 
As stated, many studies have investigated the relationships between source 
selection method (procurement variable) and contractor performance (performance 
variable); thus, we did not employ those variables for this study. Our research questions 
aimed to identify the relationship, if any, between the procurement variables and 
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performance variables for knowledge-based services. A data collection worksheet was 
constructed and provided to NAVWAR 2.0 Contracts to gather procurement and 
performance variables for the identified contracts.  
As shown in Figure 6, we collected procurement and performance variable data 
to analyze the relationship between the Actual Contract Cost and the Independent 
Government Estimate (IGCE) by exploring how three other procurement variables affect 




Figure 6. Relationship between Procurement Variables (Inputs) and 
Associated Performance Variable (Output) for Knowledge-Based 
Services (KBS) Contracts 
Independent Government Estimate (IGCE). The procurement variable IGCE 
refers to the amount, in dollars, the requiring activity team believed the contract would 
cost, as determined by specific IGCE methodology and market research.  
Business Size. The Business Size procurement variable refers to the contractor’s 
business size (Small or Other than Small Business, i.e. “Large”), as determined by the 
U.S. Small Business Administration’s table of small business size standards. Each 
business is responsible for assessing their business size—this is discussed as a limitation 
to our study, as we did not verify the contractor claim to be true. The business size is a 
secondary procurement variable, in the context of Figure 6, as the IGCE may affect 
acquisition personnel decision-making on the acquisition method.  
 
36 
Contract Award Amount. The variable Contract Award Amount is the initial 
dollar amount the government and contractor agreed the requirement was worth. In other 
words, it is the amount the buyer and the seller agreed to upon the date the contract was 
signed. Contracting professionals use the IGCE to negotiate contract awards; therefore, 
this variable is also affected by the IGCE and is considered a secondary procurement 
variable.  
Number of Modifications. The Number of Modifications procurement variable 
refers to the number of modifications the contract has had over its lifetime. The number 
of modifications is another variable that is secondary to the IGCE. The idea is that the 
contract’s dollar value can correlate with contract complexity, thus increasing the 
likelihood of contract modification. 
Actual Cost. The Actual Cost refers to the amount of money the organization 
paid to acquire the contracted services. Understanding that the contract action may not 
be expired, it is also the current obligated amount under the contract action.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methodology for data identification and collection 
methods used to answer this study’s research questions. This chapter further described 
the sources of data, types of data retrieved, and the process in which the data was 
collected, specifying the data collection criteria using the data collection worksheet.  
Although there were challenges in obtaining the number of inputs originally 
desired, overall, we managed to acquire enough data to proceed with our analysis and 
answer our research questions. NAVWAR 2.0 Contracts provided us with data 
representing an appropriate mix of small and large business contracts with varying 
contract award amounts. The following chapter specifies the results of our data analysis. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the data analysis and results based on linear regression and 
correlation techniques to identify a significant difference in the actual contract cost 
based on business size, contract award amount, and the number of modifications. 
Furthermore, the next section offers a discussion of descriptive statistics for each 
variable, followed by issues with the data and results of the data analysis. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We used one dependent variable (DV) for analysis of the data: the contract’s 
actual cost (ACTCOST). The contract’s actual cost refers to the amount of money 
obligated against the contract when the data was accessed. We propose that the actual 
cost, DV, is directly affected by the procurement variable, IV, and covariate variables 
described later. This variable is continuous. Our proposed model has one independent 
variable (IV): IGCE. We desire to test the relationship between the IGCE and the actual 
cost of the contract.  
1. Data Limitations 
As stated, there are three additional variables of interest: (1) Business Size of the 
Awardee (BIZSIZE), (2) Contract Award Amount (AWARDAMT), and (3) Number of 
Modifications (NUMMODS). Unfortunately, NAVWAR 2.0 Contracts was unable to 
provide a complete data set for all requested variables. Therefore, the sample size was 
limited to 35 cases that provided the necessary data to complete the analysis. 
Additionally, the 35 cases offered an unbalanced distribution of BIZSIZE cases (i.e., 25 
small business cases, 10 large business cases). Furthermore, as subsequently discussed, 
two cases were removed from the sample due to incomplete ATCOST data, and two 
were removed for being outliers in the graphical illustrations, further limiting the pool 
(i.e., 23 small business cases, eight large business cases).  
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Although some contracts contained IGCE data, several were missing the 
ACTCOST and NUMMODS (contract award amount was present for all). We collected 
the missing data from FPDS-NG and the original data set to populate the missing data. 
Collecting the data from FPDS-NG and the original dataset was more efficient given our 
limited data collection time. However, data within both channels are subject to human 
error—the data retrieved is only as good as the data input.  
FPDS-NG was also used to access missing data points for NUMMODS and 
ACTCOST for all contracts—with IGCE information. We removed two cases from the 
data set because we could not identify the respective ACTCOST and regarded the cases 
as incomplete. We ran a regression for the updated data set; Y: ACTCOST, X1: IGCE, 
X2: AWARDAMT, X3: NUMMODS. Furthermore, we discussed creating another 
variable out of the dependent and independent variables (i.e., the delta between 
ACTCOST and IGCE). However, we concluded that it would not add value to our 
analysis. Nevertheless, there were various subsets of data that could support some 
supplemental data analysis as indicated in Table 1, Descriptive Statistics. 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics for the procurement variables. 
Within the table, each variable presents three figures: (1) the total for the subset, (2) the 









Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median StdDev Min Max 
IGCE 
35 $12,297,382.42  $3,982,000.00  $18,986,692.67  $588,679.71  $87,660,013.00  
10 $6,680,612.63  $4,082,564.00  $6,331,040.96  $588,679.71  $21,260,458.00  




164 $5,880,413.57  $1,780,688  $16,709,272.83  $22,965.03  $174,727,318.00  
82 $3,417,455.91  $780,878.18  $6,371,673.66  $22,965.03  $42,557,744.68  
82 $8,343,371.23  $2,963,760.55  $22,560,278.81  $291,815.77  $174,727,318.00  
 
Number of  
Modifications 
146 102.48 9 183.75 1 527  
65 215.58 12 230.06 1 527  
81 11.72 9 10.94 1 66  
Actual 
Contract     
Cost 
122 $8,291,937.10  $1,430,787.72  $33,980,875.07  $163,464.42  $253,927,214.63   
61 $10,522,024.90  $862,395.64  $44,424,374.76  $163,464.42  $253,927,214.63   
61 $6,061,849.31  $2,610,479  $18,574,372.32  $291,815.77  $142,876,639.00   
Bold: Data subset total, Italicized: large business awards, Non-Italicized: small business award 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
We used multiple linear regression, also known as multiple regression, to 
perform our data analysis. The objective of multiple regression is to model the linear 
relationship between the explanatory variables (IGCE, AWARDAMT, and 
NUMMODS) and the response variable (ACTCOST).  
1. Assumption Testing 
Multiple regression possesses the following assumptions: (1) Linear 
Relationship—there is a linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
response variable, (2) Multivariate Normality—there are independent, normally 
distributed errors with a mean of 0, (3) Homoscedasticity—variance in errors is constant 
across the independent variables, and (4) Non-Multicollinearity—There are no highly 
correlated independent variables. Before observing the multiple regression model, we 
validated the assumptions mentioned above to support the model’s validity. 
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First, we evaluated the linear relationship between each independent variable 
with the dependent variable by inspecting scatter diagrams determine linearity. In each 
scatter diagram, two significant outliers were influencing the data—we removed those 
two outliers. Subsequently, we found that each independent variable had a linear 
relationship with the dependent variable. Second, we checked the normality of the 
individual independent variable, by examining standardized residuals (i.e., model errors) 
and residual plots. We used the residual plots to check the constant variance of the errors 
and independence assumptions. The normal probability plots inform us whether errors 
within the data set are normally distributed. Based on the graphical representation, the 
errors were not normally distributed. Because multiple regression expects the errors to 
be normally distributed, we resolved the non-normally distributed errors by transforming 
the dependent variable (ACTCOST), creating a new variable using natural logarithm 
transformation, LN(ACTCOST). After doing so, we determined that the errors were 
normally distributed. 
Third, we checked for homoscedasticity by using a scatterplot of the residuals 
versus each of the independent variables. There was no evidence in the scatterplots to 
indicate a violation of the constant variance assumption. Overall, it appears that this plot 
satisfies the assumption that the variance in our errors has to be constant. There is no 
cone shape, and the errors are frequently hovering zero. Hence, we found that the plots 
were homoscedastic.  
Fourth, we checked for multicollinearity using a correlation matrix, Figure 7. 
Calculating the correlation between each of the DVs and the IV is imperative to confirm 
that each explanatory variable has a linear relationship with the response variable. 
However, it is also vital to check the correlation between each DV (i.e., X1 correlated 
with X2, X1 correlated with X3, X2 correlated with X3). Having strongly correlated 
independent variables can lead to unreliable parameter estimates in the model. 
As shown in Table 2, IGCE and AWARDAMT are positively correlated 
(r=0.978). However, it is essential to note that the correlation between the IGCE and the 
contract award amount is near perfect and suggests the IGCE is informing the contract 
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award amount decision. However, there are issues post-award in controlling the cost; 
hence a possible reason the ACTCOST vs. IGCE is not as correlated (r=0.81). 
Table 5. Correlation Matrix 
Variable ACTCOST IGCE AWARDAMT NUMMODS 
ACTCOST 1       
IGCE 0.81748702 1     
AWARDAMT 0.845343487 0.980276321 1   
NUMMODS 0.682453463 0.690028423 0.618481178 1 
 
According to Kutner et al. (2005), in nonexperimental business situations, 
explanatory variables tend to be correlated with other variables in the model and with 
other variables that have a relationship with the response variable that are not included 
in the model. Such is true in this model. Because AWARDAMT and IGCE are highly 
correlated, we decided to run multiple regression on a sample with and without the 
AWARDAMT data. Upon validating all of the assumptions, we performed multiple 
linear regression (MLR)—the results are in the following section. 
D. RESULTS 
Before we discuss the results, we wanted to first establish the relationship 
between IGCE and ACTCOST. Table 3 shows that IGCE and ACTCOST have a strong 
relationship, and IGCE (p=.00000002) is a reliable predictor of ACTCOST. The purpose 
of this study was to find whether there is a relationship between IGCE and ACTCOST, 
which we find to be true based on the data provided. Additionally, we are interested in 
finding how other procurement variables such as AWARDAMT, NUMMOD, and 





Table 6. LR with only IGCE 
Variable Coefficient StdErr t P>|t| 95% CI 
IGCE 0.25302509 0.03310292 7.64358902 1.9902E-08 0.18532202 0.32072816 
  
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Number of Observations = 31 
R2 = 0.67 
Adjusted R2 = 0.66 
 
Having validated the assumptions described above, we performed the MLR 
analysis, and the following sections discuss the results.  
1. Results with Contract Award Amount Included 
The results of this model, as a whole, indicate that there is a significant 
relationship between the explanatory variables (IGCE, AWARDAMT, and NUMMOD) 
and the response variable (ACTCOST) with the contract award amount included. We 
conducted the MLR two-step testing process by first testing the model as a whole. The 
F-test result suggests that at least one of the variables in the model would be useful in 
predicting ACTCOST (p=.000005). The second test is to investigate the individual 
variables in the model, as shown in Table 4. We found that IGCE (p=.09), 
AWARDAMT (p=.01), and NUMMOD (p=.02) have a relationship with the ACTCOST 
and may have the ability to predict ACTCOST. The result is meaningful, and it suggests 
that IGCE, AWARDAMT, and NUMMOD are variables useful to forecast correctly, 
and budget for, ACTCOST. BIZSIZE, however, does not have a significant effect on 







Table 7. MLR Results with AWARDAMT  
Variable Coefficient StdErr t P>|t| 95% CI 
IGCE -6.445E-08* 3.6695E-08 -1.7564122 0.09079213 -1.399E-07 1.0976E-08 
AWARDAMT 1.2674E-07** 4.8134E-08 2.63299326 0.01405781 2.7796E-08 2.2568E-07 
NUMMOD 0.02992912** 0.01192403 2.5099834 0.01863138 0.00541892 0.05443932 
BIZSIZE 0.08885252 0.20009673 0.44404786 0.66068186 -0.3224522 0.50015724 
  
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Number of Observations = 31 
R2= 0.67 
Adjusted R2 = 0.62 
 
Because there is multicollinearity between IGCE and AWARDAMT, we decided 
to run MLR excluding the AWARDMT, results are provided in the next section. 
2. Results without Contract Award Amount Included 
By eliminating the potential collinear effect of the AWARDAMT variable, we 
find, overall, that at least one of the variables in the model have a significant relationship 
with ACTCOST (p=.00002). When delving deeper into the results, in Table 5, we found 
that the IGCE and ACTCOST relationship is more substantial, and IGCE becomes a 
better predictor of ACTCOST (p=.002), when AWARDAMT is excluded from the 
model. Additionally, we find that NUMMOD (p=.16) has a moderately weak 
relationship with ACTCOST and may not be a reliable factor for ACTCOST 
predictability. This makes sense because contracting professionals accomplish 
modifications for various reasons, some of them not associated with scope changes and 
increased cost. In other words, the number of modifications performed on a contract 
does not unveil the purpose of the modification or how the modification alters contract 
funding. Furthermore, the MLR results suggest that BIZSIZE does not significantly 





Table 8. MLR without AWARDAMT 
Variable Coefficient StdErr t P>|t| 95% CI 
IGCE 2.9868E-08*** 8.7851E-09 3.39987307 0.00211103 1.1843E-08 4.7894E-08 
NUMMOD 0.0172113 0.01204022 1.42948329 0.16433485 -0.0074932 0.0419158 
BIZSIZE -0.0878894 0.2081835 -0.4221729 0.67624168 -0.5150467 0.33926783 
  
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Number of Observations = 31 
R2 = 0.59 
Adjusted R2 = 0.54 
 
3. Results without Contract Award Amount and Business Size Included 
Exhibited in the first two MLR models, BIZSIZE does not illustrate a significant 
relationship with ACTCOST (p=.66, p=.67, respectively). When we run linear 
regression with only BIZSIZE as the explanatory variable, Table 6, the model reveals 
that BIZSIZE and ACTCOST have no significant relationship. Based on this dataset, 
BIZSIZE (p=.84), on its own, has no significant relationship with ACTCOST and 
therefore, would not be a good predictor of ACTCOST. This finding is understandable, 
based on the data provided by NAVWAR. As referenced in the Spend Analysis section 
of Chapter III, nearly 32% of NAVWAR’s total spend went to small businesses. 
Additionally, the data shows a broad range of IGCEs and contract award amounts, 
trumping the idea that only large businesses receive large contract awards. Because there 
was a high variance in contract award amount and actual costs, it makes it difficult to 
predict actual contract cost based solely on a contract awardee’s business size. 
Table 9. LR with only BIZSIZE 
Variable Coefficient StdErr t P>|t| 95% CI 
BIZSIZE -389092.07 1862330.78 -0.2089275 0.83596548 -4197986.2 3419802.04 
  
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Number of Observations = 31 
R2 = 0.001 




Due to the BIZSIZE variable’s poor performance, we decided to accomplish an 
ad hoc analysis to determine whether the models’ explanatory variables become stronger 
predictors of ACTCOST when removing BIZSIZE. Overall, the model reveals that at 
least one of the variables (IGCE and NUMMOD) is a reliable predictor of ACTCOST. 
When examining the variables closer, as exhibited by Table 7, IGCE (p=.002) has a 
significant relationship with ACTCOST and may be a reliable predictor of ACTCOST. 
NUMMOD, however, presents a moderately weak relationship with ACTCOST (p=.16). 
Table 10. MLR without AWARDAMT and BIZSIZE 
Variable Coefficient StdErr t P>|t| 95% CI 
IGCE*** 2.9718E-08 8.6481E-09 3.43631182 0.00185965 1.2003E-08 4.7432E-08 
NUMMOD 0.01684097 0.0118307 1.4234971 0.16564046 -0.0073931 0.04107506 
  
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 
Number of Observations = 31 
R2 = 0.59 
Adjusted R2 = .55 
 
E. FURTHER DISCUSSION 
To determine which of the MLR models to use for the best data interpretation, 
we referenced their adjusted R2 values to compare goodness-of-fit because they contain 
various independent variables. The adjusted R2 adjusts for the number of variables 
within the model. Therefore, as the number of variables increases, the adjusted R2 only 
increases if the added variable increases the model fit. Table 4, the three-variable MLR 
model that only excluded AWARDAMT, had an adjusted R2 of r=0.54. Table 6, the 
two-variable MLR model, excluding both AWARDAMT and BIZSIZE, has an adjusted 
R2 of r=0.55. These values suggest that adding BIZSIZE to the model does not increase 
the model fit, further supporting that BIZSIZE does not have a significant relationship 
with ACTCOST. 
Based on the evidence provided, we chose to use MLR without AWARDAMT 
and BIZSIZE for our final analysis. Based on the data provided, there is a strong 
relationship between IGCE and ACTCOST. Although a strong relationship exists, the 
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IGCE’s effect on the ACTCOST is minor; this is observed by exponentiating the IGCE 
coefficient. We found that for every one-unit increase in the IGCE, there is 
approximately a .000003% increase in ACTCOST. This poor result may be due to the 
small sample size, possibly not sufficiently representing NAVWAR as a whole. Finally, 
there is also a moderately weak relationship between NUMMOD and ACTCOST—there 
should be a supplementary study to better measure this relationship.  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the data analysis and results based on linear regression 
and correlation techniques to identify a significant difference in the actual contract cost 
based on business size, contract award amount, and the number of modifications. 
Furthermore, this chapter discussed descriptive statistics for each variable, followed by 
issues with the data and results of the data analysis. The following chapter provides our 






VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND AREAS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The DoD has long struggled with cost overruns in major acquisition programs 
(Gideon & Wasek, 2015). Researchers have attempted to identify the cause of these 
overruns, but the numerous independent variables involved make this a difficult task. 
Additionally, the DoD remains on the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) 
High-Risk List for contract management, and the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) 
declared that DoD contract management is a top 10 management challenge. 
Furthermore, the root causes of significant acquisition program correlated risks, 
according to Gideon and Wasek (2015), are within one of four categories: 
programmatic/business, technical, schedule, and cost. Instead of focusing on the causes 
of the cost overruns, this research examined the relationship between the Independent 
Government Cost Estimate (IGCE), and the actual cost of products and services 
procured by the U.S. government, specifically the DoD. Overall, this research focused 
on the relationship between IGCEs and actual contract costs and how that relationship is 
affected by other procurement variables. 
The problem addressed in this research was the disparity between estimated 
contract cost, contract award amount, and actual contract cost upon completion. Naval 
Information Warfare Systems Command (NAVWAR) acquisition professionals have 
come to expect the IGCE to be significantly higher than the proposal and subsequent 
contract award. Additionally, they observed that the actual contract costs are much 
closer to the IGCE than the award amount. This delta between estimated and actual costs 
causes budgeting issues and inefficiencies between the distinct programs for which 
NAVWAR is responsible. Overall, a study to understand the relationship between these 
different costs and how they affect each other provided insight into the need for accurate 





Based on the results of our data analysis, we are now able to answer the research 
questions presented in Chapter I. 
1. What is the relationship between IGCEs and actual contract costs? 
For the first research question, our data analysis concluded that the relationship 
between IGCE and actual contract cost is significant. By using MLR, we determined 
that IGCE has a strong relationship with and is a reliable predictor of actual contract 
cost. The strength of this relationship changed as we introduced other procurement 
variables, such as business size, contract award amount, and number of modifications. 
This strong relationship is significant because it reemphasizes the importance of 
accurate IGCEs and the government’s ability to predict the actual cost of their contracts.  
2. How do the following procurement variables affect that relationship? 
For the second research question, our data analysis revealed that the relationship 
between the three different procurement variables observed is as follows: 
i. Contract Award Amount 
Based on our analysis, when contract award amount is included as an 
explanatory variable in our model, the relationship between IGCE and actual 
contract cost weakens. This may be explained by the multicollinearity between 
the two explanatory variables. Based on the data, the correlation between IGCE 
and contract award amount is near perfect, suggesting that the IGCE informs the 
contract award amount. Additionally, this is a positive finding for contracting 
organizations because they want IGCEs to influence negotiations with 
contractors and inform contract award decisions. However, this finding does not 
support NAVWAR’s initial concern that there are major variances between the 
IGCE and contract award, based on the data provided. Overall, when 
incorporating both IGCE and actual contract cost as explanatory variables, the 




ii. Number of Modifications 
Based on our analysis, the number of modifications has a moderately 
significant relationship with actual contract costs. However, when the contract 
award amount and business size explanatory variables are removed from the 
model, the number of modifications present a moderately weak relationship with 
actual contract costs. This moderately weak relationship with actual contract cost 
means that number of modifications may not be a reliable factor for actual 
contract cost predictability. This could be due to the wide range of reasons for 
contract modifications. While some modifications could be large in scope, some 
could be simple administrative modifications that are small in scope and low in 
cost. Furthermore, introducing number of modifications to the model weakens 
the relationship between the IGCE and actual contract cost. In procurement 
planning, future modifications are not included as a line item in an IGCE for a 
particular requirement. While modifications are common, the government does 
not predict the amount of modifications and/or their cost when an generating an 
IGCE. Overall, when incorporating both IGCE and number of modifications as 
explanatory variables, the model becomes a less reliable predictor of actual 
contract costs. 
iii. Business Size 
Based on our analysis, business size has an insignificant relationship with actual 
contract costs. This may be explained by the number of small businesses that 
were awarded large dollar contracts and conversely, the number of large 
businesses that were awarded relatively small dollar contracts. Furthermore, with 
roughly 39% of NAVWAR’s contracts being awarded to small businesses and 
the variance between IGCEs and contract award amounts so broad, business size 
as a lone explanatory variable is unreliable. Overall, it is difficult to predict 




C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although our research added understanding of the relationship between IGCEs 
and actual contract costs and how different procurement variables affect that 
relationship, there are areas of further research that we recommend. While these 
recommended areas for further research are not fully comprehensive, we believe they 
will result in a better understanding of the importance of accurate cost estimation across 
the DoD’s agencies, and the U.S. government as an enterprise. The following explains 
our recommendations for areas for further research. 
First, our research focused on a specific type of services contracts. We conducted 
data analysis on specific product service codes (PSC) that were only associated with 
knowledge-based services contracts. Further research could include a larger number of 
PSCs to get a broader view using a larger portion of the NAVWAR’s total contract 
portfolio. Additionally, analyzing exclusively knowledge-based services aided our 
understanding of the relationship between IGCEs and actual contract costs for that 
specific area, but other types of services may glean different cost estimation challenges. 
Further research into these other types of services could deepen our understanding of the 
challenges the DoD faces in cost estimation. 
Second, our research focused on one specific Navy organization’s contract data 
for our analysis. Further research could be conducted on other Navy systems commands 
(e.g., NAVSEA, NAVAIR, etc.). Additionally, further research could analyze other DoD 
agencies, including non-defense-related service contracts. This would provide a data set 
that would ensure more robust data analyses to broaden our understanding of this topic 
from a government enterprise level. Overall, including more organizations in further 
research will result in a better understanding of trends among government organizations 
regarding cost estimation and could reinforce the importance of accurate IGCEs to 
program offices across the enterprise. 
Third, our research utilized a data set from a snapshot in time of 7 fiscal years. 
Further research could cast a wider net for the spend data to allow for a larger, more 
robust data set for analysis. Broadening the scope of contract data analyzed will provide 
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a larger picture for data and trend analysis for cost estimation accuracy and its 
relationship to the actual cost of the contracts awarded by the government. Overall, the 
more data available for analysis, the more accurate the sight picture will be to 
understand the relationships between all the variables discussed throughout our research. 
Lastly, our researched analyzed three different procurement variables: (1) 
business size, (2) contract award amount, and (3) number of modifications. Further 
research could either incorporate a larger number of procurement variables or modify 
the three variables being analyzed. Incorporating more procurement variables will allow 
the research to analyze more relationships and how they are affected with changes in the 
variables. Furthermore, changing the variables being analyzed could provide a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between procurement and performance variables and 
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